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INCOMING MESSAGE  
COSSAC

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

From: AGWAR  
To : SHAEF

Dated: 310053Z  
Rec'd: 311705A

Ref. No. : W16455  
Precedence : PRIORITY

Security : ~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR : GENERAL EISENHOWER'S PERSONAL ATTENTION.  
FROM : GENERAL HANDY SIGNED GENERAL MARSHALL.  
REF : Your S-50068, 27 March.  
AFHQ MEDCOS 76, 28 March.



British Chiefs of Staff replied to the U.S. proposal regarding ANVIL and OVERLORD substantially as reported by you as their views in your S-50068. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have now dispatched their reply which is summarized below:

It points out that we cannot accept a diversion of landing craft from the Pacific operations unless it is the firm intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff now to mount ANVIL on a 2-division basis, target date, 10 July, in time to support OVERLORD. We state that we are firm in our conviction that a decision must be taken to launch ANVIL on a specific date. Such a decision and preparations for the operation in no way preclude changing our plans should an undeniably better course of action be indicated by changing circumstances. In our opinion, the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff that we postpone the issuance of a directive to General WILSON to proceed all-out along the line of a specific course of action amounts to admitting that the decision as to what happens next in the MEDITERRANEAN will continue to rest with the Germans. It is our conviction that we should adopt a plan which will reverse this situation so that the decision as to our course of action will rest with us. Further, we are convinced that if we launch an offensive to relieve the bridgehead at the earliest possible moment, thereafter maintain pressure to contain the maximum number of German divisions in ITALY, develop a positive amphibious threat against the MEDITERRANEAN coast of FRANCE at the time of OVERLORD, and are prepared to launch an ANVIL by 10 July, we will have placed ourselves in the best position to divert the maximum forces from OVERLORD no matter what the Germans may do in the MEDITERRANEAN. We point out that it is perhaps not clear to the British Chiefs of Staff that the decision as to the action on movement of U. S. troops and supplies is now being held up pending a decision on ANVIL. We cannot afford to provide resources sufficient to support OVERLORD and, at the same time, to reinforce the MEDITERRANEAN when there exists no firm decision and clear-cut plan for operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

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Our view is that there should be no delay in providing the Allied Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN, with a firm directive. We state that we are not satisfied with ALEXANDER's estimate reported by WILSON in MEDCOS 76 that an operation to unite the main front and the bridgehead cannot be launched until 14 May. We are not satisfied that there is a necessity in the long delay before launching the attack and we state that in our opinion, General ALEXANDER's estimate may have been colored by his plans for subsequent operations in ITALY pursuant to the existing directive. The situation in the MEDITERRANEAN at present indicates that existing directives no longer fit the situation and that the new directive is urgently required. We have proposed that the message to you and the Allied Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN, formerly proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, be dispatched at once. In this directive, the three U.S. fighter groups remain in the MEDITERRANEAN and we have allowed for the British Chiefs of Staff to make adjustments in the matter of total LST's withdrawn from the MEDITERRANEAN to support OVERLORD.

S-50068, originated by SUPREME COMMANDER, 27 March 1944.  
MEDCOS 76, 28 March, British Chiefs of Staff (ACTION)

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Authority J.C.S. Memo  
Date 1/4/74  
By D.J.H., NARS Date 3/28/74

~~SECRET~~  
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958  
NWD by \_\_\_\_\_ date \_\_\_\_\_

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